Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, is continuing a longstanding tradition of its Soviet-era forbearer, the KGB, by leveraging a relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), legally known as the Moscow Patriarchate, for operational gains and to advance state influence. Outside of intelligence work, the ROC also has a longstanding role as a foreign policy tool of the state.
This article surveys the longstanding relationship between Moscow’s foreign intelligence service and this denomination of Christianity, to include a brief look at methods employed by Russian intelligence and the long-term implications on the Church’s credibility, and the motivations of its operations, as a faith-based organisation. It also briefly covers the history of the ROC’s employment as a tool of the state’s foreign policy.
Images Sourced From: King of religions, The Presidential Press and Information Office, Пресс-служба Президента Российской Федерации, Министерство обороны
1 Current Situation and Recent History
1.1 Patriarch Kirill’s KGB Ties
According to material from Soviet archives, the current head of the ROC, Patriarch Kirill (Vladimir Gundyaev) was an active officer of the KGB prior to his rise in the church. Kirill is also a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, himself a former KGB officer and former director of Russia’s domestic intelligence and security service, the FSB.
Swiss National Archives files declassified in 2023 provide compelling evidence that Kirill worked for the KGB. To influence the Swiss Federal Council while living in Geneva in the early 1970s as Moscow’s official representative at the World Council of Churches (WCC). The files, labelled “Monsignor Kirill,” record the Patriarch’s clandestine mission under the code name “Mikhailov” and note that the council was already infiltrated by the KGB.
Despite the evidence from Soviet and Swiss archives, Kirill’s nephew, Mikhail Gundyaev, who currently serves as head priest of a church in a Geneva neighbourhood, stated in an interview with Sonntagszeitung in 2023 that his uncle was likely not an agent. But was placed “under the KGB’s strict supervision.” The ROC has refused to comment on Kirill’s reported espionage activity in Geneva. Meanwhile, the WCC has maintained that it has no information about the case. [source, source, source, source, source, source, source, source]
2 Earlier KGB Influence on the Russian Orthodox Church
2.1 Widespread Clerical Cooperation with the KGB
KGB agents maintained significant influence within the ROC during the 1960s. The church is used as a tool for political control and intelligence gathering domestically and abroad.
Some materials, from declassified KGB records, reveal that Metropolitan Filaret of Kyiv, a prominent ROC bishop in the 1970s and 1980s, was recruited as an agent under the codename “Antonov” before 1957. Filaret’s numerous foreign travels–including a 1961 assignment to Alexandria, Egypt–indicate his role as a well-established KGB asset. Internal reports from the Ukrainian State Security Service archives dating back to 1957 and 1958 provide early references to “Antonov,” who reportedly provided intelligence on visiting delegations, including details about their activities and behaviours.
In the early 1990s, declassified KGB documents revealed that most high-ranking clergy within the ROC worked closely with Soviet intelligence agencies under assigned codenames such as “Abbot” and “Adamant.” [source, source]
A Soviet-era document discovered in Estonia suggests that Patriarch Alexy II, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, may have been a fully-fledged KGB agent. While allegations of his collaboration with the Soviet secret police under the codename “Drozdov” (Thrush) have circulated since a brief examination of secret police files in Moscow in 1991, this newly surfaced document provides the first publicly available evidence indicating that Alexy was not just a passive collaborator but an active KGB agent from 1958.
The document implies that Alexy used his ties to the KGB to advance his ecclesiastical career at a time when the Soviet authorities were actively repressing organized religion. While the Russian Orthodox Church has dismissed the document as a forgery, it has not provided any concrete evidence to disprove its authenticity. Alexy himself had remained silent on the matter. [source, source, source, source, source]
2.2 KGB’s Attempt to Silence a Priest
Not all Russian Orthodox clergy willingly cooperated with the KGB. Some resisted, only to face brutal suppression. One of the most notable cases is Fr. Dmitri Dudko, a Moscow priest whose public sermons openly challenged Soviet atheism in the 1970s. Dudko’s attitude of resistance to Soviet repression led to continuous harassment by the KGB.
2.2.1 Dudko’s Act of Resistance and Persecution
The KGB saw Dudko as a threat. Dudko gained a large following by addressing moral decay, alcoholism, and the spiritual emptiness of Soviet life. He was arrested in January 1980, and accused of passing ‘slanderous materials’ to Western journalists. Also, he was forced to publicly renounce his views in a staged televised confession. Widely regarded as a decisive move by the Soviet state to quash any remaining independence within the Russian Orthodox Church. His confession, reportedly filled with KGB-prepared phrases, left him broken, stating that “compared to the hell that I then brought into my soul, anything—even torture or execution—would have been easier to bear.”
Despite his earlier heroism, Dudko’s later years were marked by a controversial shift in ideology. Under Gorbachev’s perestroika, he became associated with nationalist and authoritarian viewpoints, advocating for strong leadership akin to Stalin or Putin. This stance distanced him from many of his former supporters. Rendering him largely irrelevant to the generation he had once inspired.
There is no direct evidence that the KGB tried to recruit Dudko as an informant and that he explicitly refused. However, his continued refusal to align with Soviet propaganda suggests he would have resisted recruitment. The KGB typically targeted influential clergy for either recruitment or elimination. Since Dudko never worked with the KGB, his public humiliation shows they saw him as a threat, not an ally. He passed away in 2004. Remembered both as a courageous spiritual leader who stood against Soviet oppression. And also, as a man ultimately crushed by the very forces he resisted. [source, source, source]
2.3 Beyond Intelligence: A Strategic Tool for Russian Foreign Policy
Going back to the early 1940s, under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, Moscow used the ROC to legitimize his authoritarian government and spread the values of the state. Persecution of the church under subsequent dictators paused, but did not end, the long-term role of the church as a state tool. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ROC continued to serve as a strategic tool for Russian foreign policy objectives. Extending its influence beyond religious affairs to support geopolitical ambitions. We still have this dynamic in play today. [source]
2.3.1 Sweden’s Security Concerns and Investigations
In March 2024, Sweden officially withdrew funding for Moscow Patriarchate-linked churches, citing intelligence reports indicating their use for espionage and hybrid influence operations. Swedish authorities expressed concerns that the ROC’s presence in strategic locations could pose a significant security threat to NATO. Further reports indicated that an Orthodox church in Västerås, Sweden, located near Stockholm-Västerås Airport and critical infrastructure, was financed by Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation. Which has known intelligence links. Investigations suggested that the church, constructed in traditional Russian architectural style, had ties to the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. And also was used as a centre of support for pro-Kremlin forces backing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
In September of the same year, in Sweden, an investigation by Norran uncovered ties between the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian intelligence. Sweden’s security service (Säpo) classified the ROC as a national security risk, warning of an increased threat of Russian sabotage. The report highlighted connections between Orthodox churches in Sweden, Ukraine, and Russia, with clergy in Västerås receiving medals signed by the head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service (SVR). A Russian embassy representative, reportedly linked to Russian espionage, attended a church inauguration in Sweden. Similar concerns led other countries to act, with Bulgaria and North Macedonia expelling Russian clergy. The FBI warned about the Kremlin’s use of Russian Orthodox churches in intelligence operations. [source, source, source]
2.3.2 Czech Intelligence Takes Action
Later in 2024, Czech intelligence launched an investigation into the ROC’s operations in the country. Following concerns from the Czech Senate that the Church was being used as a vehicle for Russian propaganda. Czech officials also sanctioned Patriarch Kirill for his support of Russia’s war on Ukraine. And expelled Russian Orthodox cleric Nikolai Lysenyuk, who was accused of fostering secessionist movements within the EU with Russian support. [source]
2.3.3 Bulgaria Expels Russian Clergy
In September 2023, Bulgarian authorities expelled Archimandrite Vasian. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church in Bulgaria, along with two employees of St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker church in Sofia. The Bulgarian government cited threats to national security as the reason for their expulsion. The Kremlin’s embassy in Sofia condemned the decision, calling it an unacceptable act. The expulsion highlighted growing concerns in Eastern Europe regarding the ROC’s role in furthering Russian influence beyond its borders. [source]
2.3 Future Trends and Implications
We have not seen any indications that the ROC’s strong role in Russia’s foreign policy strategy, including intelligence work, will change in the coming years. If anything, we anticipate that its role could grow before we see any decrease. The Kremlin’s reliance on the Church as an informal diplomatic and intelligence tool aligns with Russia’s broader hybrid warfare tactics.
As NATO and EU countries strengthen counterintelligence efforts, expulsions of ROC-affiliated clergy and increased scrutiny of church activities may intensify. However, Moscow is expected to adapt by shifting influence operations to proxy organisations, cultural initiatives, and financial networks. The intersection of religion, intelligence, and geopolitics will remain a critical vector of Russian influence in Europe and beyond.
3 Conclusion
The Church has been involved in diplomatic engagements with Orthodox communities abroad, often aligning with Kremlin narratives on issues such as Ukraine and Western influence. Reports suggest that ROC representatives have engaged in soft power diplomacy in regions of strategic interest, such as the Balkans and the Middle East, to reinforce Russia’s geopolitical presence. The ROC’s role in reinforcing Russian national identity and soft power efforts is closely linked to the state’s broader strategic objectives, with clergy often acting as unofficial intermediaries in foreign policy discussions.
While the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the legacy of KGB influence persists within the ROC. Allegations continue regarding the Church’s cooperation with modern Russian intelligence services, particularly under Patriarch Kirill’s leadership. The case of Father Dudko, also highlights how the KGB used forced public confessions as a method of control, ensuring that no independent religious movement could challenge the state. The infiltration of the ROC by the KGB was a calculated effort to control a key cultural institution. While the Cold War has ended, the church remains a potent instrument for state influence, necessitating ongoing, close examination.
